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HOW TO CREATE INTERNATIONAL LAW: THE 
CASE OF INTERNET FREEDOM IN CHINA 
KATHERINE TSAI* 
INTRODUCTION 
In early 2010, Google, Inc. (“Google”) announced that it was no 
longer willing to assist the People’s Republic of China (“China”) with 
censoring Google search engine results in mainland China. Google 
subsequently disabled Google.cn and redirected web users to 
Google.com.hk, an uncensored search portal based in Hong Kong. 
Google’s actions prompted spirited responses from both the United States 
and Chinese governments, and exposed a fundamental difference between 
the two countries’ ideologies regarding internet freedom. Like Google, the 
United States stressed the importance of internet freedom to human rights 
and trade. In contrast, China claimed that internet freedom was another 
variation of Western imperialism and would cause political instability. 
Unlike China, this Note begins from the premise that internet freedom is a 
desirable norm that can encourage government accountability, advance 
educational goals, and spur artistic and scientific innovation. Based on this 
premise, this Note examines how the United States, a state actor, and 
Google, a non-state actor, may achieve internet freedom in China through 
the creation of international law. 
This Note constructs a variant of one scholar’s theory of international 
law to explore the ways in which state and non-state actors can induce 
internet freedom through international law. In How International Law 
Works: A Rational Choice Theory, Professor Andrew Guzman uses the 
concept of the “Three Rs of Compliance” or “reputation, reciprocity, and 
retaliation” to explain why state actors comply with existing hard and soft 
international law (“legal” and “quasi-legal” agreements, respectively).1 
This Note expands Guzman’s rational choice theory by applying it to state 
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 1. ANDREW T. GUZMAN, HOW INTERNATIONAL LAW WORKS: A RATIONAL CHOICE THEORY 9 
(2008). 
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actors and the creation of international rules. When applied to the creation 
of international law, the original definitions of Guzman’s reputation, 
reciprocity, and retaliation evolve into a new concept that this Note terms 
the “Three Rs of Cooperation.” The Three Rs of Cooperation—a variation 
of Guzman’s rational choice theory—describe why a state actor might enter 
into a new international agreement. This Note applies the Three Rs of 
Cooperation to the circumstances of early 2010 to explain how China may 
one day enter an international agreement guaranteeing internet freedom to 
its citizens. 
In developing the Three Rs of Cooperation, this Note broadens 
Guzman’s rational choice theory to include non-state actors. Although 
Guzman’s original theory only analyzes the role of state actors in 
international law, it is necessary to examine the role of non-state actors in 
this context because of their significant influence in shaping the 
international conversation concerning internet freedom. A “non-state actor” 
is used primarily in this Note to describe multinational companies such as 
Google or Microsoft Corp. (“Microsoft”) that are capable of influencing 
state behavior. 
Although the rhetoric employed by Google and the United States 
frames internet freedom as an essential human right,2 this Note does not 
discuss how internet freedom may be achieved through human rights 
instruments. Human rights instruments that protect the freedom of 
expression, such as Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights,3 Article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights,4 and customary international law are arguably not binding 
obligations upon China, even if freedom of expression may be said to 
encompass internet freedom.5 The question of whether existing legal 
 
 2. See, e.g., Hillary Rodham Clinton, U.S. Sec’y of State, Remarks on Internet Freedom (Jan. 21, 
2010) (transcript available at http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2010/01/135519.htm); see also 
“Google and Internet Control in China: A Nexus Between Human Rights and Trade?” Hearing Before 
the Congressional-Exec. Commission on China, 111th Cong. 34-37 (2010) [hereinafter Davidson 
Testimony] (testimony of Alan Davidson, Director of Public Policy, Google Inc.), available at 
http://www.scribd.com/doc/28866040/032410-Alan-Davidson-Testimony. 
 3. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, art. 19, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., 
183d plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 10, 1948). 
 4. Int’l Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI) A, art. 19, U.N. GAOR, 
21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (Dec. 16, 1966). 
 5. First, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights is a nonbinding agreement. Second, China 
has not ratified the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and technically has no 
obligation to uphold the substantive obligations of the treaty. See Status of the Int’l Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights, U.N. T. Collection, http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src 
=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-4&chapter=4&lang=en (last visited Feb 10, 2011). Finally, it is arguable 
whether internet freedom has existed long enough under the banner of freedom of expression to 
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obligations require China to provide internet freedom to its citizens is 
outside the scope of this Note. 
In summary, this Note fashions a theory that explains state 
cooperation with the creation of international law by building upon 
Guzman’s theory of state compliance with existing international law, and 
applies this theory to the context of internet freedom in China. Part I 
discusses the events surrounding Google’s withdrawal from China in early 
2010. Part II summarizes Guzman’s rational choice theory of international 
law. Part III redefines the role of reciprocity, retaliation, and reputation in 
the Three Rs of Cooperation, a variation of Guzman’s rational choice 
theory. It uses the Three Rs of Cooperation to contemplate how the actions 
of both state and non-state actors can create international law. Part IV 
examines how state and non-state actors may use the Three Rs of 
Cooperation most effectively. It also considers how the choice between the 
hard and soft law forms may aggravate or mollify China’s objections to a 
potential agreement that establishes internet freedom in China. Ultimately, 
this Note concludes that the United States and Google are most likely to 
achieve internet freedom in China through the concurrent use of the Three 
Rs of Cooperation, the collaboration of other state and non-state actors, and 
the soft law form. 
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
On January 12, 2010, Google announced that sophisticated hackers in 
China had targeted several prominent U.S. companies and stolen valuable 
intellectual property from Google.6 Perhaps more seriously, these cyber 
 
constitute customary international law. In particular, China has adamantly denied that it has violated the 
freedom of expression. Rather, China refers to Google’s withdrawal and the United States’ subsequent 
call to promote internet freedom as “information imperialism.” Opinion, The Real Stake in “Free Flow 
of Information,” GLOBAL TIMES (Jan. 22, 2010), available at http:// 
opinion.globaltimes.cn/editorial/2010-01/500324.html. This Note refers to English language editorials 
and articles from Chinese state-run newspapers—for instance, Xinhua, China Daily, and Global 
Times—as indicative of the Chinese government’s public stance. These editorials and articles represent 
the message that the Chinese government desires to convey to its own people and the international 
community. See Worldpress.org, World Newspapers and Magazines, China, 
http://www.worldpress.org/newspapers/asia/china.cfm (listing affiliations of major newspapers in 
China); China’s State-Run Media Chastise Google, CBS NEWS (Mar. 22, 2010), available at 
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2010/03/22/business/main6322336.shtml (arguing that the Chinese 
government reportedly told news editors to “get on message” criticizing Google); Tania Branigan, 
China Defies Media Cuts and Closures with New Newspaper Launch, THE GUARDIAN (U.K.) (Apr. 20, 
2009), available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/apr/20/china-newspaper-launch (describing 
the launch of Global Times as a “part of the Chinese government's drive to promote its views to an 
international audience and reshape the country's reputation”). 
 6. David Drummond, A New Approach to China, THE OFFICIAL GOOGLE BLOG (Jan. 12, 2010), 
http://googleblog.blogspot.com/2010/01/new-approach-to-china.html. 
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attackers had “routinely accessed” the Gmail accounts of Chinese, 
American, and European human rights supporters.7 Although Google never 
accused the Chinese government directly,8 Google declared that it was no 
longer willing to help the Chinese government censor search results on 
Google.cn, and that it was reviewing the feasibility of its continued 
operations in China.9 Google’s accusations were confirmed when 
diplomatic cables leaked to WikiLeaks revealed that the Chinese Politburo 
directed “computer sabotage . . . [of Google], American government 
computers, . . . Western allies, . . . and American businesses.”10 
Less than a week following Google’s announcement, the U.S. 
government promoted internet freedom from “a piece of . . . foreign policy 
arcana” to the forefront of its foreign policy agenda.11 Secretary of State 
Hillary Clinton stated that “new technologies do not take sides in the 
struggle for freedom and progress, but the United States does. We stand for 
a single internet where all of humanity has equal access to knowledge and 
ideas.”12 Secretary of State Clinton directed her speech toward all 
repressive countries, but specifically named China as a state that threatens 
“the free flow of information.”13 She referred to the conflict involving 
Google and China, stating that she expected “Chinese authorities to 
conduct a thorough review of the cyber intrusions that led Google to make 
its announcement.”14 
Chinese media swiftly denounced the U.S. government’s criticisms of 
China as a repressive country.  For instance, Xinhua, a government-owned 
Chinese newspaper, requested that the United States “stop unreasonable 
accusations on China in the name of so-called Internet Freedom.”15 
Government officials asserted that, far from restricting internet freedom, 
“[t]he Chinese constitution protects . . . citizens’ freedom of speech” and 
 
 7. Id. Gmail is a web-based email service provided by Google. 
 8. Davidson Testimony, supra note 2, at 35. 
 9. Id. 
 10. Scott Shane & Andrew W. Lehren, Leaked Cables Offer Raw Look at U.S. Diplomacy, N.Y. 
TIMES (Nov. 28, 2010), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/29/world/29cables.html. 
 11. Alec Ross, Senior Advisor for Innovation, U.S. State Dep’t, State Dep’t Officials Brief 
Reporters on Internet Freedom (Jan. 22, 2010), available at http://www.america.gov/st/texttrans-
english/2010/January/20100123124856SBlebahC1.357234e-02.html. 
 12. Clinton, supra note 2. 
 13. Id. 
 14. Id. 
 15. China Urges U.S. to Stop Accusations on So-Called Internet Freedom, XINHUA (Jan. 22, 
2010), available at http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/china/2010-01/22/c_13147126.htm. For 
information on Xinhua as a government-owned Chinese newspaper, see Worldpress.org, supra note 5. 
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“China’s internet is open.”16 China Daily, also a state-run newspaper, 
stressed that the internet in China promotes “social democracy and 
pluralism” because it is “one of the major channels for people to offer tips 
on abuse of power by officials and lodge complaints about wrongdoings by 
governments at all levels.”17 The newspaper also claimed that the United 
States has no cause to criticize China for repressing information on the 
internet, because the internet has evidently caused “economic and political 
reform” and improved freedom of speech in China.18 
Chinese media argued that the U.S. government was attempting to 
impose “information[al] imperialism” upon China and other developing 
countries by demanding universal access to an open internet.19 Chinese 
media described Secretary of State Clinton’s call for “an unrestricted 
Internet . . . [as] a disguised attempt to impose its values on other cultures 
in the name of democracy.”20 A Chinese editorial described the U.S. 
government’s appeal to internet freedom as “smart sanctions” meant to 
“export democracy” and thereby instigate a change in government 
regime.21 The Global Times criticized the concept of “freedom of speech” 
as “an aggressive political and diplomatic strategy, rather than a desire for 
moral values.”22 Because many countries cannot match the “informational 
control and dissemination” of Western countries, an unrestricted internet 
would be tantamount to further disadvantaging non-Western nations.23 To 
support its accusations, Chinese media noted that the United States had 
 
 16. Id. 
 17. Internet Safety, Order, CHINA DAILY (Jan. 23, 2010), available at http:// 
www.chinadaily.com.cn/cndy/2010-01/23/content_9365529.htm. For information on China Daily as a 
state-run newspaper, see Worldpress.org, supra note 5. 
 18. Id. 
 19. The Real Stake in “Free Flow of Information,” supra note 5. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Googling Sanction Targets, CHINA DAILY (Mar. 18, 2010), available at http:// 
www.chinadaily.com.cn/opinion/2010-03/18/content_9606924.htm (quoting Adam Szubin, a director of 
the U.S. Department of Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets). 
 22. The Real Stake in “Free Flow of Information,” supra note 5. See also Ian Buruma, Battling 
the Information Barbarians, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 29, 2010), available at http://online.wsj.com/ 
article/SB10001424052748704878904575031263063242900.html (explaining that Chinese officials 
often view criticism of their human rights policy or politics “as  an attack on Chinese culture” or “an 
attempt to ‘denigrate China’”). The Global Times is affiliated with People’s Daily, a newspaper run by 
the Chinese Communist Party. See Worldpress.org, supra note 5. 
 23. The Real Stake in “Free Flow of Information,” supra note 5. The Chinese argument appears 
to assert that because information production in the United States outpaces information production in 
China and non-Western nations, citizens of non-Western nations would be unfairly swayed to believe 
that democracy is the correct form of governance. Thus, restrictions on the internet are necessary to 
level the ideological playing field. 
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recently formed a cyber warfare division24 and that shortly before Google’s 
announcement on January 12, 2010, the Secretary of State dined with “the 
leaders of the powerful information enterprises such as . . . Microsoft, 
Twitter and Google.”25 Chinese media thereby implied that the United 
States government was conspiring with American information industry 
giants to topple China. 
Although China claims that it censors only websites that encourage 
violence or terrorism or that disseminate illicit material such as child 
pornography,26 several nonprofit and human rights organizations have 
reported that the Chinese government actively engages in censorship and 
repressive activities that extend far beyond its claims.27 Besides actively 
censoring websites,28 the Chinese government controls the rapid spread of 
“negative news reports” on the internet using an approach called “Control 
2.0.”29 Under Control 2.0, the Chinese government nullifies the 
 
 24. Commentary, Don’t Impose Double Standards on “Internet Freedom,” XINHUA (Jan. 24, 
2010), available at http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/china/2010-01/24/c_13148512.htm. 
 25. Google, Do Not Take Chinese Netizens Hostage, XINHUA (Jan. 20, 2010), available at http:// 
news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/indepth/2010-01/20/c_13143639.htm. 
 26. See, e.g., Don’t Impose Double Standards on “Internet Freedom,” supra note 24 (defending 
China’s restrictions on the internet by pointing out that the United States also regulates terrorist and 
pornographic activities on the internet); China Says Internet Regulation Legitimate and Reasonable, 
XINHUA (Jan. 25, 2010), available at http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/china/2010-
01/25/c_13149272.htm (noting that Chinese internet regulations are based on, inter alia, the Law on the 
Protection of Minors). 
 27. See, e.g., Joanne Leedom-Ackerman, The Intensifying Battle Over Internet Freedom, THE 
CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR (Feb. 24, 2009), available at http://www.csmonitor.com/ 
Commentary/Opinion/2009/0224/p09s01-coop.html (noting that China is “particularly adept at blocking 
Internet use” and “leads the list of countries with . . . the highest number of writers in prison”). See also 
Global Internet Freedom: Corporate Responsibility and the Rule of Law: Hearing Before the S. Comm. 
on the Judiciary, Subcomm. on Human Rights and the Law, 110th Cong. (May 20, 2008) (testimony of 
Arvind Ganesan, Director, Business and Human Rights Program, Human Rights Watch), available at 
http://judiciary.senate.gov/hearings/testimony.cfm?id=3369&wit_id=7184 (“We also learned that US 
companies, including Google, Microsoft, and Yahoo!, censor their search engines in China, in 
anticipation of what Chinese censors expect and in addition to what the Chinese government’s firewall 
prohibits.”). 
 28. Andrew Jacobs, Chinese Learn Limits of Online Freedom as the Filter Tightens, N.Y. TIMES 
(Feb. 4, 2009), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/05/world/asia/05beijing.html (reporting 
that a Chinese Internet affairs bureau official admonished his peers “to check the channels one by one, 
the programs one by one, the pages one by one”). See generally HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, “RACE TO 
THE BOTTOM”: CORPORATE COMPLICITY IN CHINESE INTERNET CENSORSHIP 18:8 (C) (2006), available 
at http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/china0806webwcover.pdf (describing the Chinese 
government’s curtailment of freedom of expression on the Internet and the complicity of multinational 
companies including Yahoo!, Microsoft, Google, and Skype); OPENNET INITIATIVE, INTERNET 
FILTERING IN CHINA (2009), available at http://opennet.net/sites/opennet.net/files/ONI_China_2009.pdf  
(describing the Chinese government’s posture toward Internet censorship). 
 29. OPENNET INITIATIVE, supra note 28, at 3. 
TSAI_PROOF3 3/28/2011  2:54:50 PM 
2011] INTERNET FREEDOM IN CHINA 407 
dissemination of damaging information by issuing “‘authoritative’ facts” 
through “state news agencies such as Xinhua and the People’s Daily.”30 
After weeks of silence,31 Google finally announced in late March 2010 
that it was automatically diverting mainland Chinese internet users from its 
censored Google.cn search engine to its uncensored Google.com.hk search 
engine based in Hong Kong.32 In the weeks preceding the announcement, 
the Chinese government refused to make any concessions regarding 
China’s internet policy during talks with Google.33 In fact, far from 
relaxing its policies, China strengthened its censorship and surveillance 
practices in April 2010 by amending the Protection of State Secrets Law, so 
that the government could force foreign companies to release information 
on their customers relating to “leaks of state secrets.”34 The amendment 
gives the Chinese government great power, due to the fact that “[a]lmost 
any information can be classified as a state secret in China . . . even 
information [that is] publicly circulated.”35 
Google maintained its stance against censorship through June 2010, 
but it backed down from its original threat to leave China.36 On June 30, 
2010, Google’s Internet Content Provider license was due to be renewed by 
the Chinese government.37 Without a renewed license, Google would not 
be able to operate in China, and the Chinese government made it plain that 
it would not renew the company’s license if Google continued to redirect 
mainland Chinese users of Google.cn to Google.com.hk.38 In order to 
comply with China’s demands and yet not abandon the moral high ground 
of its stance against censorship, Google stopped automatically redirecting 
mainland Chinese internet users in June 2010 from Google.cn to 
Google.com.hk,39 but provided a link on Google.cn so that users could still 
 
 30. Id. at 3-4. 
 31. Kevin Voigt, China Partners to Google: Decide Now, CNN (Mar. 17, 2010), available at 
http://www.cnn.com/2010/BUSINESS/03/17/china.google.letter/index.html. 
 32. Miguel Helft & David Barboza, Google Shuts China Site in Dispute Over Censorship, N.Y. 
TIMES (Mar. 22, 2010), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/23/technology/23google.html. 
 33. Elinor Mills, In Post-Google China, Censorship is Unfazed, CNET NEWS (Mar. 26, 2010), 
http://news.cnet.com/8301-27080_3-20001212-245.html. 
 34. Sky Canaves, Beijing Revises Law on State Secrets, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 29, 2010), available at 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703572504575213944098022692.html; see also 
Kathrin Hille, China Includes Internet in Secrets Law Revision, FIN. TIMES (Apr. 29, 2010), available 
at http://www.ft.com/cms/s/2/d7944740-537d-11df-bfdf-00144feab49a.html. 
 35. Canaves, supra note 34. 
 36. Helft & Barboza, supra note 32. 
 37. David Drummond, An Update on China, THE OFFICIAL GOOGLE BLOG (June 28, 2010), 
http://googleblog.blogspot.com/2010/06/update-on-china.html. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. 
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click through to Google.com.hk.40 By doing so, Google complied with 
China’s regulations and successfully renewed its Internet Content Provider 
license.41 
While Google could have remained silent regarding the cyber attacks 
like other victimized companies,42 it instead vocally campaigned against 
internet censorship. Google executives called for the U.S. government to 
prioritize internet freedom in U.S. foreign policy, arguing that internet 
censorship creates human rights violations and barriers to trade.43 Google 
offered several methods to combat internet censorship; for instance, Google 
suggested that U.S. companies could disclose any requests by foreign 
governments for companies to censor information or to produce personal 
information concerning their clients.44 To demonstrate its commitment to 
transparency and the freedom of expression, Google unveiled on April 20, 
2010 a new online tool that discloses government requests received by 
Google for “user data or content removal.”45 
Google’s influence on state policy and its focus on human rights, 
transparency, and freedom of expression has prompted journalists and 
academics to describe Google as a quasi-state.46 In February 2010, Sergey 
Brin, Co-Founder of Google and President of Google’s Technology 
 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. Many interpreted Google’s actions to appease the Chinese government so that Google’s 
license could be renewed to mean that Google had lost its battle against censorship in China. Surojit 
Chatterjee, Google Seen Losing Censorship Battle Against China Govt, May Lose License, INT’L BUS. 
TIMES (July 1, 2010), available at http://www.ibtimes.com/articles/32005/20100701/google-seen-
losing-censorship-battle-against-china-govt-may-lose-license.htm. 
 42. John Markoff, Cyberattack on Google Said to Hit Password System, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 19, 
2010), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/20/technology/20google.html. 
 43. Davidson Testimony, supra note 2, at 36. 
 44. Id. at 36-37. 
 45. David Drummond, Greater Transparency Around Government Requests, THE OFFICIAL 
GOOGLE BLOG (Apr. 20, 2010), http://googleblog.blogspot.com/2010/04/greater-transparency-around-
government.html; see also Google, Transparency Report: Government Requests, http:// 
www.google.com/governmentrequests/ (follow “China” hyperlink) (last visited May 22, 2010). Data 
regarding China is markedly absent from this tool, because “Chinese officials consider censorship 
demands as state secrets.” Id. 
 46. The quasi-state nature of powerful multinational companies is not new; the British East India 
Company is a famous example. See Peter Marshall, The British Presence in India in the 18th Century, 
BBC (Nov. 5, 2009), http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/british/empire_seapower/east_india_01.shtml; see 
also Jeffrey Rosen, Google’s Gatekeepers, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Nov. 28, 2008), available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/30/magazine/30google-t.html (“‘To love Google, you have to be a 
little bit of a monarchist, you have to have faith in the way people traditionally felt about the king,’ Tim 
Wu, a Columbia law professor and a former scholar in residence at Google, told me recently. ‘One 
reason they’re good at the moment is they live and die on trust, and as soon as you lose trust in Google, 
it’s over for them.’”). 
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division,47 stated that Google chose to enter the Chinese market in 2006 not 
out of a desire to increase revenue streams, but rather to do “what’s best for 
the Chinese people.”48 For Google to focus on “what’s best” for a people 
rather than solely on its profit margin is a remarkable “mixing and 
matching of the interests of what a nation-state is all about and what a 
corporation is all about.”49 Google’s need to have a foreign policy 
regarding government censorship in foreign jurisdictions arises from the 
fact that what it is providing to other countries “isn’t a product or a service, 
it’s a freedom.”50 Its role as a distributor of information forces Google to 
absolutely need[] a foreign policy, and it needs a foreign policy about 
free speech, and about privacy, and about intellectual property, and 
about the whole range of issues that a society confronts . . . . 
[especially because Google] seem[s] to be more concerned about free 
speech than a lot of the countries that they are interacting with as a 
foreign power.51 
Google’s ability to attract the attention of both the United States and 
Chinese governments simply by threatening to cease business operations in 
China not only points to Google’s quasi-state nature and its consequent 
need for a foreign policy, but also Google’s unique capacity to influence 
international law. 
 
II. A RATIONAL CHOICE THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 
This Part summarizes Guzman’s rational choice theory of state 
compliance with international law and describes the three mechanisms by 
which a state calculates the costs and benefits of compliance. This Part 
concludes with Guzman’s explanation of why hard and soft international 
law may be functionally equivalent in terms of affecting state behavior. 
 
 47. Google, Corporate Information: Google Management, 
http://www.google.com/corporate/execs.html (last visited Oct. 13, 2010). 
 48. Interview by Chris Anderson, TED Curator, with Sergey Brin, Co-founder and President, 
Technology, Google Inc., at TED2010 (Feb. 24, 2010), available at http://blog.ted.com/2010/02/ 
our_focus_has_b.php. 
 49. Interview by John Hockenberry, host of The Takeaway, with Jeffrey Rosen, professor of law 
at George Washington Univ. (Apr. 22, 2010), available at http://www.thetakeaway.org/2010/apr/22/ 
what-googles-foreign-policy/transcript/. 
 50. Mark Landler, Google Searches for a Foreign Policy, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 27, 2010), available 
at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/28/weekinreview/28landler.html (quoting writer Clay Shirky). 
 51. Interview by John Hockenberry, supra note 49. 
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A. The Three Rs of Compliance 
Guzman’s How International Law Works: A Rational Choice Theory 
explains why states choose to comply with existing international 
agreements. Guzman begins from the assumption that a state will only 
comply with an international agreement if the benefits of complying with 
the agreement exceed the benefits of not complying.52 “Benefit” is defined 
loosely—it may be a present or future, reputational or nonreputational gain, 
and the state may value a benefit differently at different points in time.53 
According to Guzman, a state calculates the benefits of complying with 
international agreements by considering three mechanisms deemed “‘the 
Three Rs of Compliance’—reputation, reciprocity, and retaliation.”54 
Guzman defines reciprocity as actions that are “taken without the 
intent to sanction the violator . . . [and are] not costly to the reciprocating 
state.”55A typical reciprocal action may consist of one state’s decision to 
withdraw from an international agreement because the other state has 
chosen to violate the obligation.56 Thus, reciprocal actions are considered 
“adjustment[s] in a state’s behavior motivated by a desire to maximize the 
state’s payoffs in light of new circumstances or information.”57 Guzman 
does not explicitly discuss whether opportunity costs are considered “costs” 
for the purpose of defining reciprocal actions. Guzman raises the example 
of the Boundary Waters Treaty between the United States and Canada.58 He 
posits that if Canada withdrew, then the United States might consider “that 
the expected payoff from termination is greater than the expected payoff 
from compliance.”59 The United States’ termination of the Boundary 
Waters Treaty would be considered a reciprocal action taken in response to 
Canada’s violation of the treaty.60 Although the United States would be 
better off if both parties upheld the treaty, Guzman does not seem to 
consider this lost opportunity cost relevant in determining whether an 
action is “costless” and therefore whether it qualifies as a “reciprocal 
 
 52. See GUZMAN, supra note 1, at 17 (assuming states are rational and “able to identify and pursue 
their interests”). 
 53. See id. at 56. 
 54. Id. at 9. 
 55. Id. at 33. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. at 44. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. 
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action.”61 Accordingly, this Note assumes that opportunity costs are not 
relevant when determining whether actions are “costless.” 
Guzman defines retaliation as “actions that are costly to the retaliating 
state and [are] intended to punish the violating party.”62 Retaliatory actions 
may take the form of “economic, diplomatic, or even military sanctions.”63 
They are useful as a “signal to the violating state (and other states) that the 
sanctioning state will punish violations,” which in turn “encourage[s] the 
violating state” to comply with the existing obligation and deters the 
violating state from committing future violations.64 
Guzman defines reputation as a state’s “reputation for compliance 
with international law.”65 A state may have a different reputation for 
compliance for any given area of the law.66 For instance, a state may 
possess a positive (or strong) reputation for compliance in trade law but a 
negative (or weak) reputation for compliance in environmental law.67 A 
positive reputation for compliance in the context of international law 
confers credibility upon a state.68 States with positive reputations can more 
easily enter into future agreements and extract greater concessions from 
other states.69 However, “a state’s reputation will be changed only to the 
extent that the state’s behavior differs from what observing states have 
expected.”70 Because certain “states would behave consistently with treaty 
obligations even if the treaty were not in existence,”71 their compliance 
does not improve their reputations. For example, Trinidad and Tobago’s 
compliance with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty does not signal 
anything regarding its reputation for compliance because it lacks the 
infrastructure to develop nuclear weapons and therefore could not feasibly 
violate the treaty even if it desired.72 
 
 61. See id. at 33, 42-44. 
 62. Id. at 34. 
 63. Id. Goldsmith and Posner recognize that promising cash in exchange for a concession may be 
functionally indistinguishable from threatening military sanctions against a nation. JACK L. GOLDSMITH 
& ERIC A. POSNER, THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 117-18 (2005). 
 64. GUZMAN, supra note 1, at 48. 
 65. Id. at 33. 
 66. See id. at 100-11. 
 67. See id. at 109. 
 68. Id. at 34-35. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. at 75. 
 71. Id. at 80. 
 72. Id. at 79-80. 
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B. The Costs and Benefits of Compliance 
Because a legal obligation qua legal obligation “is just one of many 
factors that affect the incentives of states,”73 a state’s decision to comply 
with international law also accounts for both the nonreputational and 
reputational payoffs of compliance.74 Nonreputational payoffs include 
domestic gains and losses, such as those relating to the domestic economy 
or national security,75 and international gains and losses, such as the 
potential reciprocal or retaliatory actions taken by other state actors.76 
Reputational payoffs include reputational gains and losses that affect the 
“many future opportunities for cooperation that require . . . [states] to make 
credible promises, or . . . an ongoing relationship with a partner that makes 
a good reputation especially valuable.”77 If a state does not perceive the 
need to make credible promises in the international community, then 
reputational gains are less valuable to such a state.78 
C. Soft Law Versus Hard Law 
Agreements between state actors may take the form of either hard law 
(binding treaties) or soft law (nonbinding agreements) and still influence 
state behavior.79 As Guzman explains, the choice between hard and soft 
law is not binary, but rather “different points on a spectrum of 
commitment.”80 Soft law is generally considered to be “international 
agreements that fall short of formal treaties but nevertheless seek to 
influence state conduct.”81 Because soft law is nonbinding, states may find 
the soft law form attractive because, among other reasons, the reputational 
cost of violating a nonbinding agreement is less than the cost of violating a 
binding treaty.82 However, the structure of a soft law agreement affects 
whether the agreement is functionally binding, if not technically so. For 
example, the inclusion of “some form of dispute resolution[,] . . . 
monitoring procedures[,] . . . reservations[,] . . . [or] exit and escape 
clauses” into the agreement increases or decreases “the seriousness of the 
 
 73. Id. at 15. 
 74. Id. at 74-75. 
 75. Id. at 78, 82. 
 76. See id. at 82. 
 77. Id. at 75. 
 78. Id. at 75-76. 
 79. Id. at 142. 
 80. Id. at 144. 
 81. Id. at 23, 220 n.27. 
 82. Id. at 141. 
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commitment.”83 Design elements like these “maximize the credibility” of a 
state’s commitment to an international agreement.84 Guzman emphasizes 
that the technical form of the international agreement is inconsequential 
because what matters to his rational choice theory is the ability of the 
agreement to change state behavior.85 Therefore, a nonbinding agreement 
can be just as effective as a formal treaty in changing state behavior. 
III. THE THREE RS OF COOPERATION 
This Part builds upon Guzman’s “Three Rs of Compliance” to explain 
how internet freedom can be achieved through a new international 
agreement. Because of Google’s ability to advance internet freedom from 
an arcane U.S. foreign policy point to a hotly contested international issue, 
this Part examines the ability of both state and non-state actors to affect the 
payoffs for China of creating an agreement that establishes internet 
freedom. To do this, this Note employs a new explanatory mechanism 
called the “Three Rs of Cooperation.” 
The Three Rs of Cooperation applies Guzman’s concepts of 
reputation, retaliation, and reciprocity to the creation of international law. 
The Three Rs of Cooperation are nominally identical to Guzman’s Three 
Rs of Compliance, but these Rs take on different significance when applied 
to the creation of, and not compliance with, international law. In particular, 
rather than examining a state’s reputation for compliance with international 
law, as Guzman does, this Note examines a state’s reputation for 
cooperation with respect to the creation of international law. 
This Part first discusses the importance of China’s reputation for 
cooperation in the context of internet freedom. Next, it discusses the 
reciprocal and retaliatory actions that state and non-state actors could take 
to influence Chinese policy on internet freedom. Finally, it discusses 
China’s domestic concerns in deciding whether to adopt internet freedom. 
A. Reputational Payoffs 
The greatest difference between the “Three Rs of Compliance” and 
the “Three Rs of Cooperation” concerns reputation. In Guzman’s theory, a 
state’s decision to comply or not comply with an existing international 
agreement affects the state’s reputation for compliance.86 In the context of 
creating international agreements, a state’s reputation for cooperation is 
 
 83. Id. at 134. 
 84. Id. at 135. 
 85. See id. 
 86. Id. at 73-82. 
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affected by its decision to work with other states to create an international 
agreement. Thus, a state’s reputation for cooperation improves when it (1) 
actively contributes to diplomatic negotiations or talks; (2) participates in 
the writing and production of an international agreement; (3) signs an 
international agreement; and/or (4) ratifies an international agreement.87 A 
state’s compliance with an existing agreement also adds to its reputation for 
cooperation. When a state engages in any of the above actions, other states 
perceive that the state is striving to achieve a shared goal of creating and 
implementing new international law. Each of the above actions individually 
contributes to a state’s reputation for cooperation,88 but, when combined, 
these actions garner a larger increase in reputational capital for a state than 
a single action alone. 
In the context of creating international agreements, a state is 
concerned about its reputation for cooperation.89 A positive reputation for 
cooperation signals that a state is willing to solve mutual problems with 
other state actors through international law. State actors would perceive 
such a state as a “team player,” and would approach the state with 
relatively more trust and candor.90 If one temporarily disregards a state’s 
economic or political might, a state with a positive reputation for 
cooperation will be more readily approached to create new agreements. 
State actors may hesitate before conferring with uncooperative states, if at 
all. Uncooperative states are less willing to work with other states to craft 
an agreement, and consequently state actors are more likely to work 
“around” uncooperative states, perhaps excluding such states from the 
process of crafting an international solution altogether. 
A state’s reputation for cooperation correlates with its reputation for 
compliance. State actors may be attracted to entering agreements with a 
state that possesses a positive cooperative reputation because it is more 
likely that such a state will comply with the resulting agreement. Granted, a 
state’s positive reputation for cooperation will not guarantee its compliance 
with an agreement. Unforeseen events that occur between crafting the 
agreement and complying with the agreement may change the state’s 
reputational and nonreputational payoffs.91 However, a state that sacrifices 
 
 87. A state’s signing or ratification of a legal obligation does not necessarily signal a state’s 
compliance with the treaty. See id. at 78, 177-79. 
 88. For instance, one can imagine a state that participates in treaty talks in good faith, but later 
ceases any further cooperation due to domestic disapproval. 
 89. See GUZMAN, supra note 1, at 33. 
 90. See id. at 34-35. 
 91. See supra notes 73-78 and accompanying text. Alternatively, the state may simply have 
entered the agreement negotiations in bad faith. 
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significant amounts of time and effort at the negotiating table 
correspondingly becomes more invested in the agreement’s success. 
Cooperating with the creation of an agreement now means the state will 
likely comply with the agreement later. Furthermore, after agreement 
negotiations conclude, a state continues to build its positive reputation for 
cooperation if it complies by the agreement’s terms. Because a state with a 
negative cooperative reputation may have been excluded from the 
negotiation process, it is less likely to comply with an agreement that it had 
no part in creating. 
Strong reputations for cooperation are most important for state actors 
in multilateral, global situations where an agreement’s success or failure is 
not contingent upon any one state.92 Examples of multilateral, global issues 
include environmental pollution, nuclear proliferation, and internet 
freedom. States known to be cooperative are more likely to be approached 
by other states for input and assistance; therefore, cultivating a reputation 
for cooperation is important for states that wish to have a continuous and 
active voice in global policymaking. Because parties can always be coerced 
into complying with international agreements even if they did not 
participate in the creation of such agreements,93 a positive reputation for 
cooperation affords states an opportunity to create palatable legal regimes 
ex ante. A positive reputation for cooperation is less important when one 
state’s consent is necessary for the potential agreement to succeed. In this 
instance, the state becomes a necessary participant and state actors will 
approach the state regardless of its reputation for cooperative behavior. For 
example, if an agreement concerns Canadian coastal waters, then interested 
state actors must ensure that Canada joins agreement negotiations and is 
satisfied with the resulting agreement. Otherwise, such an agreement will 
most certainly fail. 
Since China is known for its strict censorship policies, China’s 
reputation for cooperation with respect to internet freedom is probably 
negative.94 Criticism of China’s internet policy and monikers such as the 
“Great Firewall” indicate that the perception of China as a repressive state 
is entrenched.95 Western countries understand that China views “the 
 
 92. Of course, an agreement relating to a multilateral, global issue would fail if the number of 
noncompliant states reached a critical mass. 
 93. See GUZMAN, supra note 1, at 60-63. 
 94. Cf. id. at 75. Many state actors agree that internet freedom is a desirable norm. See, e.g., 
Internet Governance Forum 2, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, Transcript of Opening Session (Nov. 12, 2007), 
available at http://www.intgovforum.org/Rio_Meeting/IGF_opening_Session.txt. 
 95. See, e.g., James Fallows, The Connection Has Been Reset, THE ATLANTIC (Mar. 2008), 
available at http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2008/03/-ldquo-the-connection-has-been-
reset-rdquo/6650/; Emily Parker, Leaping the Great Firewall of China, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 24, 2010), 
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Internet as a ‘core interest,’ an issue of sovereignty [on par with Taiwan 
and Tibet] on which Beijing will brook no intervention.”96 The West also 
views China’s unyielding reaction to Google’s announcement and 
subsequent withdrawal “as a proxy for [China’s] broader confrontation 
with the West over rights, trade, climate change, and declining American 
hegemony.”97 Based on China’s public refusal to compromise with 
Google,98 state actors should expect that China will not easily cooperate 
with creating internet freedom through a new legal instrument. 
Nevertheless, the United States could use the prospect of a positive 
gain in China’s reputation for cooperation as a bargaining chip. On the one 
hand, the United States must recognize that whether China values a 
positive reputation for cooperation depends on if China believes there is 
anything to gain by cooperating with the international community. China’s 
increasing dominance on the world stage means that it may be unwilling to 
compromise with other state actors through international law.99 
Furthermore, other state actors may invite China to participate in the 
creation of new legal instruments in spite of a poor reputation for 
cooperation100 because of China’s economic, military, and political 
strength.101 On the other hand, China has been “seeking to expand its 
influence” in the international community by pursuing “a larger voice in 
international organizations . . . [such as] the International Monetary 
Fund . . . [and] has also begun to expand its international peacekeeping 
efforts.”102  The United States should strongly emphasize to China that its 
reputation for cooperation with respect to internet freedom is inextricably 
tied to its reputation for cooperation in other areas of the law.103 Because a 
“state’s reputation will be changed only to the extent that the state’s 
 
available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704896104575139742687410862.html; 
Austin Ramzy, The Great Firewall: China’s Web Users Battle Censorship, TIME (Apr. 13, 2010), 
available at http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1981566,00.html. 
 96. Michael Wines, Stance by China to Limit Google is Risk by Beijing, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 23, 
2010), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/24/world/asia/24china.html [hereinafter Stance by 
China to Limit Google is Risk by Beijing]. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Mills, supra note 33. 
 99. Ian Bremmer, China vs America: Fight of the Century, PROSPECT (Mar. 22, 2010), available 
at http://www.prospectmagazine.co.uk/2010/03/china-vs-america-fight-of-the-century/. 
 100. See id. (“[A]t December’s climate change summit in Copenhagen, . . . China spearheaded 
resistance from developing states to western-proposed targets on carbon emissions.”). 
 101. See U.S.-CHINA ECON. AND SECURITY REV. COMMISSION, 2009 REPORT TO CONGRESS 15-17, 
available at http://www.uscc.gov/annual_report/2009/annual_report_full_09.pdf. 
 102. Id. at 15. 
 103. Cf. GUZMAN, supra note 1, at 100-06. 
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behavior differs from what observing states have expected,”104 China’s 
refusal to create a new legal instrument on internet freedom will have no 
effect on its (negative) reputation for cooperation with respect to internet 
freedom. However, China’s reputation for cooperation will improve 
dramatically if it collaborates with the United States to create an agreement 
concerning internet freedom. China could thereby use internet freedom to 
increase its reputational capital in the international community, attract the 
goodwill of Western democracies, and thus leverage significantly greater 
influence in the creation of international law in the future. 
Foreign non-state actors care about a state’s reputation for cooperation 
to the extent that it affects their business interests. Generally, a state’s 
reputation for cooperation is not an important concern. When determining 
whether to invest in a particular state, non-state actors are primarily 
interested in the suitability of domestic conditions, such as the applicable 
tax rate or the stability of a political environment.105 Thus, the interests of a 
non-state actor typically do not require a state to make international 
commitments.106 
For certain non-state actors, however, a state’s willingness to engage 
in international obligations serves as an important proxy for its 
commitment toward a course of action that is valuable to the non-state 
actor’s business interests. For instance, a state that has made domestic and 
international commitments to internet freedom has more to lose than if it is 
only willing to make domestic commitments. If a state agrees to implement 
internet freedom through both domestic law and international law, then 
violating internet freedom would incur not only domestic but also 
international costs for that state. International law thereby signals to a non-
state actor that a state’s pledge toward a course of action is relatively more 
certain. 
Internet freedom is an important business interest for many non-state 
actors in China. Besides Google, other foreign non-state actors have ceased 
business operations in China due to China’s policies on internet freedom.107 
After China increased surveillance upon domestic domain name registrants, 
 
 104. Id. at 84. 
 105. See MULTILATERAL INVESTMENT GUARANTEE AGENCY & DELOITTE & TOUCH, LLP, 
FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT SURVEY 19 tbl. 2 (2002). 
 106. See id. 
 107. See, e.g., Tim Arango, U.S. Media See a Path to India in China’s Snub, N.Y. TIMES (May 3, 
2009), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/04/business/media/04media.html (“[M]any 
companies have been pulling . . . [out from China because] of frustration over censorship, piracy, strict 
restrictions on foreign investment and the glacial pace of its bureaucracy.”). 
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GoDaddy.com (“GoDaddy”) ceased domain name registration in China.108 
If GoDaddy ever decides to resume operations in China, China’s reputation 
for cooperation will be important to the extent that it illustrates China’s 
decision to implement internet freedom. If China later believes that 
GoDaddy’s return to the Chinese market is desirable, China could woo 
GoDaddy and other like-minded foreign non-state actors back to its 
markets by making both domestic and international pledges to internet 
freedom.109 China’s engagement with the international community would 
demonstrate China’s sincere commitment to internet freedom. 
B. Reciprocity 
In the framework of internet freedom, reciprocity entails a costless 
change in the behavior of state actors in response to China’s refusal to 
create an international agreement.110 A reciprocal action allows state actors 
such as the United States to maximize their own gains once they realize a 
state intends to act in a certain manner.111 Previously, Guzman illustrated 
the concept of reciprocity by pointing to a state’s decision to withdraw 
from an existing international agreement when it discovers another state 
has violated the agreement.112 Here, in the context of creating international 
law, the choice a state actor faces is not whether to comply with an existing 
agreement, but whether to join or devise new international law. For 
example, if China refuses to enter a new agreement on internet freedom, 
the United States may act reciprocally by also declining to enter the 
agreement.  Although the United States firmly believes in the value of 
internet freedom, it may not wish to commit to the firm obligations of an 
agreement. Alternatively, the United States may cease to engage China in 
talks concerning the internet because it believes that China is unlikely to 
change its policies on censorship in the near future. If China is reluctant to 
diminish its participation in the formation of international law, this 
reciprocal action may lead China to relax its internet policies.113 
The newly signed Daniel Pearl Freedom of the Press Act and the 
proposed Global Online Freedom Act are two examples of reciprocal 
 
 108. Ellen Nakashima & Cecilia Kang, In Response to New Rules, GoDaddy to Stop Registering 
Domain Names in China, WASH. POST (Mar. 25, 2010), available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
wp-dyn/content/article/2010/03/24/AR2010032401543.html. 
 109. Because China has many domestic companies that offer the same services as GoDaddy.com 
and Google, China may not believe it will ever be necessary to woo these non-state actors back into the 
Chinese market. See infra note 121 and accompanying text. 
 110. Cf. GUZMAN, supra note 1, at 33. 
 111. Id. 
 112. See supra note 56 and accompanying text. 
 113. See U.S.-CHINA ECON. AND SECURITY REV. COMMISSION, supra note 101, at 15. 
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actions taken by the U.S. government in response to repressive countries 
that restrict the flow of information. The Daniel Pearl Freedom of the Press 
Act “requires the State Department to expand its scrutiny of news media 
restrictions and intimidation as part of its annual review of human rights in 
each country.”114 The Act specifically acknowledges the negative effect of 
censorship on internet journalism.115 Although the annual reporting 
requirement does not directly affect repressive countries, the requirement 
signals to countries worldwide the importance of press freedom, including 
internet freedom, to the United States.116 Such a signal may encourage 
countries to relax their censorship policies and promote press freedom in 
order to curry favor with the U.S. government. The proposed Global Online 
Freedom Act would require non-state actors to take reciprocal actions 
against repressive countries.117 Under the Act, American businesses must 
disclose to the U.S. government any requests by repressive governments to 
produce personally identifiable information of customers, to filter search 
engine results, or to implement censorship.118 Presumably, the Global 
Online Freedom Act envisions that repressive governments will relax their 
censorship when faced with certain disclosure of their policies to the U.S. 
government.119 
Non-state actors may also engage in costless reciprocal actions in 
order to adjust to—and influence—the behavior of a state. For instance, 
multinational companies like Google may choose to limit their services in 
response to state policies. When Google first entered the Chinese market, it 
refused to offer internet services such as Gmail and Blogger until Google 
could guarantee that its users’ information would remain private.120 
However, these reciprocal actions will not influence China’s behavior if 
China believes it can adequately rely on domestic companies to provide the 
same or similar services as Google or other multinational companies.121 As 
 
 114. U.S. to Promote Press Freedom, N.Y. TIMES (May 17, 2010), available at http:// 
www.nytimes.com/2010/05/18/world/18press.html. 
 115. See Daniel Pearl Freedom of the Press Act, H.R. 1861, 111th Cong. § 2(a)(3) (2009). 
 116. See generally id. 
 117. See Global Online Freedom Act, H.R. 2271, 111th Cong. (2009). The Global Online Freedom 
Act has been introduced in Congress in every session since 2007. See H.R. 2271: Global Online 
Freedom Act, GOVTRACK.US, http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=h111-2271&tab=related. 
 118. H.R. 2271 §§ 203-05. 
 119. See id. § 2(6). 
 120. Andrew McLaughlin, Google in China, THE OFFICIAL GOOGLE BLOGSPOT (Jan. 27, 2006), 
http://googleblog.blogspot.com/2006/01/google-in-china.html. As mentioned previously, Gmail is 
Google’s web-based email service. Blogger is Google’s weblog publishing tool. 
 121. See David Barboza, China’s Internet Giants May Be Stuck There, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 23, 
2010), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/24/business/global/24internet.html; Bremmer, 
supra note 99; Kathrin Hille, The Internet: A Missing Link, FIN. TIMES (London) (Jan. 19, 2010), 
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long as Google is unable to provide unique services to China, then 
Google’s reciprocal actions will not affect China in the information 
technology market. 
Joining the Global Network Initiative (“GNI”) is a reciprocal action 
that non-state actors in the technology and telecommunications industry 
may take to influence the behavior of states. GNI is a non-profit alliance of 
“stakeholders in the global information and communications (ICT) 
technology industry.”122 Members of GNI include non-state actors such as 
Google, Microsoft, and Yahoo! Inc. (“Yahoo!”).123 GNI aims to achieve a 
universal standard of behavior for private companies “to protect and 
advance the human rights of freedom of expression and privacy when faced 
with pressures from governments to take actions that infringe upon these 
rights.”124 For instance, GNI policy suggests that its participants “[r]equest 
that government demands to limit freedom of expression or privacy and the 
legal basis for such demands [be] made in writing” and “[c]onsider[] 
challenging governments in courts or other formal forums when faced with 
restrictions that appear inconsistent with domestic law or international 
human rights laws and standards on freedom of expression and privacy.”125 
If governments know that attractive non-state actors will adhere to GNI 
policies in reaction to censorship and surveillance activities, then 
governments may be willing to relax their repressive information laws in 
order to avoid confrontation with GNI participants. 
C. Retaliation 
Encouraging states to enter or create new international legal regimes 
by retaliation can take various forms. For example, a retaliatory action 
could be as blunt as the United States using military force to coerce China 
into allowing internet freedom. In the nineteenth century, Britain forcibly 
took possession of Portuguese ships to compel Portugal into ceasing its 
slave trade.126 Britain also burned Brazilian ships that it suspected were 
 
available at http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/a7bdfbae-054b-11df-a85e-00144feabdc0.html [hereinafter The 
Internet: A Missing Link]. 
 122. Global Network Initiative, Governance Charter, 3, http://www.globalnetworkinitiative.org/ 
cms/uploads/1/GNI_-_Governance_Charter.pdf (last accessed Feb 10, 2011). 
 123. Global Network Initiative, Participants, http://www.globalnetworkinitiative.org/participants/ 
index.php (last accessed Feb. 10, 2011). 
 124. Global Network Initiative, FAQ, 1, http://www.globalnetworkinitiative.org/cms/uploads/ 
1/GNI_-_FAQ_PDF.pdf (last accessed Feb. 10, 2011). 
 125. Id. Some of the specific actions recommended by GNI, such as “challenging governments in 
courts” are retaliatory. However, merely joining the GNI is still a costless action that non-state actors 
may take before they begin activities in a particular state. Retaliation is discussed infra Part III.C. 
 126. GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 63, at 116. 
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trafficking slaves, prompting the Brazilian foreign minister to state: “With 
the whole of the civilized world now opposed to the slave trade, and with a 
powerful state like Britain intent on ending it once and for all, can we resist 
the torrent? I think not.”127 The Brazilian foreign minister’s comment 
suggests that a broad consensus in the international community and the 
presence of a forceful hegemon can pressure China into permitting internet 
freedom. However, the United States’ economic dependence upon China 
and the reputational backlash that the United States would incur if it used 
military force means that the United States is unlikely to elect this option. 
State actors can also choose retaliatory actions subtler than outright 
economic or military sanction. “Subtle” retaliation takes advantage of a 
symbiotic relationship between China and the United States. The United 
States must condition an attractive benefit upon the implementation of 
internet freedom within Chinese borders. This method is desirable, because 
China has already expressed interest in maintaining cooperation with the 
United States.128 Arvind Ganesan of Human Rights Watch has noted that 
the challenge of promoting internet freedom as a key human rights issue 
“will be to . . . incorporat[e] internet freedom into diplomacy, trade policy, 
and meaningful pressure on companies to act responsibly.”129 In other 
words, if the United States can tie internet freedom to issues important to 
China, then the United States may convince China that internet freedom is 
crucial to the success of China’s other goals.130 
Framing internet freedom as a barrier to free trade may be a promising 
method to pressure China into implementing internet freedom through an 
international agreement. The European Centre for International Political 
Economy argues that censorship is a protectionist policy that violates the 
 
 127. Id. at 116-17. 
 128. A spokesperson for the Foreign Ministry of China stated that the United States and China 
should continue to develop “bilateral relations, strengthen dialogue, communication and cooperation, 
respect each other's core interest and great concerns, handle disputes and sensitive issues appropriately, 
so as to maintain a healthy and stable development of the China-U.S. relations.” China Urges U.S. to 
Stop Accusations on So-Called Internet Freedom, supra note 15. 
 129. US: Clinton to Press for Internet Freedom, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Jan. 21, 2010), http:// 
www.hrw.org/en/news/2010/01/21/us-clinton-press-internet-freedom. 
 130. The internet is an area that requires global coordination and therefore affords opportunity for 
subtle retaliation. For instance, China has recognized that “[i]nternet security . . . [is] a global concern 
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General Agreement on Trade in Services.131 Google recognized this when it 
repeatedly called for the U.S. government to prioritize internet freedom in 
its foreign policy so as to reduce “the trade barriers of the new technology 
era.”132 The First Amendment Coalition has also pressured “the U.S. Trade 
Representative to file a case against China on the grounds that it has been 
violating its WTO obligations . . . [for example, by] discriminat[ing] 
against foreign suppliers of Internet services by blocking them at the border 
while allowing domestic suppliers to offer like services.”133 
The United States must consider that internet freedom is inextricably 
intertwined with its security and economic interests, which may therefore 
warrant some form of retaliatory action against China.134 On a macro-level, 
relations between the United States and China suffer from significant 
information asymmetry. Whereas China benefits from the open internet in 
the United States and can exhaustively peruse American websites, the 
United States can only access limited amounts of information from Chinese 
websites. For instance, China’s censorship of political discourse on the 
internet allows the United States to obtain only a restricted glimpse of 
China’s political climate. In contrast, an open internet in the United States 
allows China access to any information regarding political unrest or 
criticism within the United States. As a result, China possesses a more 
informed understanding of the political climate in the United States. China 
has a clear advantage over the United States when the internet in China 
remains closed and the internet in the United States remains open. To 
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address this information asymmetry, the United States could consider 
blocking American websites from China as long as China refuses to open 
its internet. Blocking American websites from China would incur costs 
upon the United States while punishing China. However, doing so would 
be ideologically self-defeating, because it would undermine the United 
States’ commitment to a universally open internet.135 
Non-state actors may similarly retaliate against states unwilling to 
engage in cooperative behavior. For example, a non-state actor could 
withdraw its existing business from the state. This is retaliatory insofar as it 
incurs costs on the non-state actor and punishes the state. Google retaliated 
against China’s unwillingness to cease internet censorship by closing 
Google.cn, re-directing mainland Chinese users to Google.com.hk, and 
shutting down the majority of its mainland Chinese operations.136 Google 
also began publishing online the availability of its other services (including 
Gmail and Blogger) in mainland China.137 This disclosure was a retaliatory 
maneuver that invited scrutiny from foreign audiences interested in 
tracking Google’s services in China and, relatedly, the extent of China’s 
internet censorship. By doing so, Google probably intended to deter China 
from blocking Google’s services in China altogether. However, the actions 
of one non-state actor alone are insufficient to achieve internet freedom. 
Google’s retaliatory actions have had no short-term effect in pressuring 
China to allow internet freedom. In fact, China condemned Google for its 
arrogance: “China won’t let its regulations or laws bend to any companies’ 
[sic] threats. It is ridiculous and arrogant for an American company to 
attempt to change China’s laws.”138 
In the long-term, Google’s criticism may foment enough 
nonreputational losses that China could consider entering an international 
agreement concerning internet freedom. Google’s withdrawal “has been 
pretty bad publicity for the [Chinese] government” especially because 
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Google still has a substantial presence in China, including “tens of millions 
of [Chinese] users.”139 Analysts consider Google to be “the biggest foreign 
player in the market . . . [that has] raised the bar for the Internet 
industry . . . [and] really helped other Chinese companies develop.”140 
Many Chinese citizens appeared sympathetic to Google’s stance on internet 
freedom and “laid flowers at Google offices in Beijing, Shanghai, and 
Guangzhou.”141 Yet, thus far, Google appears to be the only GNI 
participant that has publicly objected to censorship in China.142 
Presumably, because Microsoft and Yahoo!—two other major GNI 
participants143—have not joined Google in its outcry, China does not feel 
sufficient pressure to amend its internet policy.144 If other influential, non-
state actors support Google and also threaten to withdraw from China, the 
cost of continued internet censorship for China would be significantly 
greater, and could lead to a change in Chinese internet policies. 
D. Domestic Concerns 
China perceives a strong domestic interest in preventing internet 
freedom. Based on articles published after the Google incident, the Chinese 
government believes that internet freedom creates dangerous unrest in 
society, encourages separatist movements, and threatens its system of 
governance.145 Indeed, China seems to fear that under a free internet 
regime, the United States will outpace China’s information production 
capacity and produce so much democratic propaganda that Chinese citizens 
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will be swayed to believe that democracy is the best form of governance.146 
Thus, abstract claims in favor of internet freedom, such as “the more 
information flows, the stronger the society becomes,”147 are unlikely to 
persuade China because China has different baseline assumptions 
concerning the value of internet freedom. 
On the other hand, China could benefit domestically from permitting 
internet freedom. Internet freedom could strengthen its government by 
providing greater transparency to its citizens and thereby increasing 
standards of government accountability.148 A policy of internet freedom 
could encourage media companies such as Google and Time Warner to 
expand their operations in China,149 thereby creating jobs for Chinese 
citizens. The increased presence of foreign companies could develop the 
skill and knowledge base of Chinese employees, and consequently foster 
greater innovation and entrepreneurship in China.150 By allowing internet 
freedom, China would signal to its domestic constituents and to the 
international community that it is committed to technological innovation 
and a legal environment that welcomes foreign technology and 
telecommunications companies. 
IV. HOW TO ACHIEVE INTERNET FREEDOM 
By using the case of China and internet freedom as an example, this 
Part describes how state and non-state actors could effectively deploy the 
Three Rs of Cooperation to cause a state actor to join an international 
agreement. Because the form of the agreement is inconsequential as long as 
it has the ability to affect state behavior,151 achieving internet freedom in 
China through international law is possible regardless of the binding or 
nonbinding form of an agreement. This analysis includes an examination of 
the hard and soft law forms that such an agreement could assume and still 
be acceptable to China. 
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The United States and Google can most effectively persuade China to 
create a new international agreement using subtle retaliation in the short-
term. Retaliation by Google alone is insufficient to convince China. Given 
China’s desire to encourage “indigenous innovation,” China probably does 
not find the continued presence of many foreign internet companies 
particularly necessary.152 Observers have noted that the internet in China is 
tailored for Chinese consumers and is therefore diverging from the internet 
used in the rest of the world.153 Thus, successful retaliation may proceed in 
two ways. First, state and non-state actors may threaten to withhold some 
inimitable, invaluable business or benefit for which China does not have a 
ready substitute. Second, state or non-state actors should act together. If 
these actors together threatened to withhold benefits such as trade 
opportunities, biotechnological expertise, or other unique services or 
products, then China may be persuaded to allow internet freedom within its 
borders. The concerted efforts of many state and non-state actors would be 
a nonreputational cost that China could not easily dismiss. 
Of course, China may denounce attempts to promote internet freedom 
as ideologically driven, but this should not prevent the creation of a legal 
instrument on internet freedom. China’s history of information control and 
the underlying ideological conflict between the East and West may cause 
China to view any state or non-state retaliatory action as inherently 
suspicious.154 However, even bitter ideological conflict between democratic 
and communist states is no obstacle to the creation of international law. For 
instance, during the Cold War “there were particular interests common to 
the Soviet Union and the West—in avoiding war, in limiting the spread of 
nuclear weapons, in trade”—that cemented the necessity of international 
law.155 Thus, while state and non-state actors should carefully address 
China’s claims of informational imperialism, these claims should not be an 
impediment to the development of internet freedom through a new 
international agreement. 
State and non-state actors may most effectively influence China’s 
decision to enter an agreement using reputation in the long-term. State 
actors should appeal to China’s desire to increase its influence in the 
international community. They should emphasize that a positive gain in 
China’s reputation for cooperative behavior with respect to internet 
freedom will give China more power to craft future international law. Non-
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state actors should stress that a positive reputation for cooperation will 
signify China’s willingness to engage in global issues that are important to 
the foreign telecommunications and technology industry. Non-state actors 
should remind China that a positive reputation could consequently attract 
valuable and innovative companies to the Chinese market. Because China 
is known for its censorship, permitting internet freedom will dramatically 
improve China’s reputation for international cooperation. 
Reciprocal actions by state and non-state actors are less effective than 
retaliation or reputation in the context of legally implementing internet 
freedom in China. China will most likely be the subject of a State 
Department report pursuant to the Daniel Pearl Freedom of the Press 
Act.156 The United States could also decide not to engage China in any 
negotiations concerning internet freedom. Other non-state actors could 
refuse to enter the Chinese market because their business models are better 
served in countries that value internet freedom.157 However, China’s 
dominance on the world stage and the growth of its domestic internet and 
technology companies means that the reciprocal actions of the United 
States and other non-state actors are not particularly costly to China. 
Both state and non-state actors interested in achieving internet 
freedom should consider employing reciprocity, retaliation, and reputation 
concurrently. Just as the actions of one state or non-state actor are 
insufficient to reduce the perceived rewards of China’s online censorship, 
the use of only one mechanism of cooperation will also be insufficient. The 
U.S. government should emphasize the reputational capital that China 
could gain with cooperation: uncooperative behavior may prompt China’s 
exclusion from participation in future international law. Concurrently, the 
U.S. government should make clear that it will be conducting surveys on 
the status of print and online press freedom in China pursuant to the Daniel 
Pearl Freedom of Press Act.158 The United States could link this reciprocal 
action to a subtle retaliatory action, for example, by refusing to provide 
benefits to China as long as the State Department believes the state of press 
freedom in China is unsatisfactory. Other non-state actors should publicize 
their refusal to begin or expand activities in the Chinese market due to the 
government’s censorship and surveillance practices, while concurrently 
highlighting the innovations and technologies that China could have 
attracted with a positive reputation for cooperation with respect to internet 
freedom. 
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Regardless of the method or methods that state and non-state actors 
choose, they will encounter the most difficulty minimizing the 
nonreputational concerns discouraging China from allowing internet 
freedom. China’s fears that internet freedom will destabilize its government 
appear legitimate. If the full anger of Chinese citizens were ever directed 
toward the government, then China might face civil unrest of a sobering 
magnitude. Online phenomena such as the “Human Flesh Search 
Engine”—where ordinary Netizens “hunt down and punish people who 
have attracted their wrath . . . [getting] targets of a search fired from their 
jobs, shamed in front of their neighbors, run out of town”159—embody the 
forceful potential of populist rage and vigilantism that simmers on 
anonymous Chinese web forums. 
Given China’s domestic concerns, state and non-state actors may 
better persuade China to join a new international agreement on internet 
freedom if they choose a soft law form. China’s fear of civil instability may 
deter it from entering a formal, binding multilateral treaty on internet 
freedom. Even so, a hard law agreement that allows China the flexibility to 
introduce increasing degrees of internet freedom may be more palatable to 
China than an inflexible treaty that is effective immediately. A flexible, 
non-binding soft law agreement may be more attractive to China.160 
Although soft law “represent[s] a weaker form of commitment,”161 
different design elements within a soft law agreement could increase the 
ways in which the agreement could attract state compliance.162 Thus, in 
negotiating the agreement, state and non-state actors could advocate for the 
inclusion of monitoring procedures and dispute resolutions, and the 
exclusion of exit or escape clauses and reservations.163 Additionally, a soft 
law agreement that inextricably ties internet freedom to other concerns 
such as cybersecurity or the internet’s technical infrastructure could also 
increase the agreement’s compliance pull.164 Finally, even if China entered 
a soft agreement with no intention of compliance, state and non-state actors 
could use Guzman’s Three Rs of Compliance to encourage China’s 
compliance with the agreement over time.165 A soft law agreement that 
articulates the end goal of internet freedom but allows China discretion to 
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implement internet freedom on its own terms may thereby be more 
successful than a binding treaty. 
CONCLUSION 
This Note introduced the Three Rs of Cooperation as an extension of 
Guzman’s rational choice theory to explain how China might enter an 
international agreement on internet freedom. This Note examined how 
Guzman’s concepts of reputation, reciprocity, and retaliation evolve when 
they are applied in the context of creating international law. A state’s 
reputation for cooperation is built from the numerous actions that it may 
take to ensure the creation and success of new international law. State and 
non-state actors may engage in a variety of reciprocal or retaliatory actions 
to cajole a state into cooperating with the creation of international law. 
While either subtle retaliation or reputation alone is more effective than 
reciprocity in convincing China to cooperate, these three mechanisms are 
most effective if used together. Similarly, state and non-state actors will be 
more successful if they combine their efforts to induce China’s 
cooperation. 
Given that China fears negative domestic payoffs from allowing 
internet freedom, it will be easier to persuade China to enter an agreement 
if there is some procedural flexibility built into the agreement’s terms. For 
instance, state and non-state actors could propose a hard law treaty which 
introduces internet freedom to China by piecemeal, thereby allowing the 
Chinese government the space to resolve its fears of political instability. It 
is likely easiest to convince China to enter a “non-binding” soft law 
agreement. If a soft law form is used, state actors should strengthen the 
agreement’s compliance pull by including design elements such as 
monitoring procedures into the agreement. 
Of course, the United States and Google could do nothing and simply 
wait. China may one day be technologically unable to censor the internet. 
The “Great Firewall” is already said to be “far from impenetrable” for 
“web-savvy citizens.”166 Over time, internet censorship may become a 
Danaidian task that China will be unable to sustain. Technology grows by 
leaps and bounds. Although China has made tremendous efforts to censor 
the internet,167 China will probably always struggle against new technology 
circumventing its restrictions. 
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Finally, in order to establish internet freedom in China, state and non-
state actors must define internet freedom unambiguously. In response to 
Google and the United States’ claims that it was restricting the internet, 
China countered that its citizens freely enjoyed the benefits of an open 
internet.168 While the truth may lie in a gray area between these two 
assertions, a clear definition is necessary so that no state may claim to be 
upholding internet freedom when it is in fact not. The Chinese constitution 
already protects the freedom of expression;169 it is up to Google and the 
United States to translate this protection into reality. If state and non-state 
actors define internet freedom carefully, internet freedom as an 
international obligation also has fruitful implications for the softening of 
digital rights management regimes. Internet freedom may thereby prove to 
be a potent weapon with which to defend the freedom of expression and the 
public domain. 
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